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Ian McCready-Flora

Associate Professor

B.A. Philosophy, Swarthmore College
M.A. Philosophy, University of Michigan
Ph.D. Philosophy, University of Michigan

AOS: Ancient Greek Philosophy
AOC: Aesthetics, Epistemology, Applied Ethics


Ian specializes in Ancient Greek Philosophy and has substantial side interests in contemporary Aesthetics, Epistemology and Applied Ethics.

His book-length project concerns Aristotle's conception of rationality. What is it about human thinking that distinguishes it from the sorts of thinking other animals are capable of? Of particular importance is our capacity to form beliefs. Unlike wisdom, understanding and expertise—all high-level perfections of reason—beliefs are piecemeal and fallible, yet still beyond the reach of any non-human mind. Aristotle's theory of belief, however, gets relatively little attention compared to his deductive model of science and knowledge. A serious effort at understanding it, then, can tell us what on his view distinguishes the rational from the non-rational.

Ian is also writing on ancient conceptions of knowledge and its relation to other mental states; Aristotle’s response to Protagoras, both the sophist himself and his Platonic shadow; and the history and prehistory of the emotions and their place in our mental lives.

Representative Publications

2023. "Aristotle on Reasoning and Rational Animals." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101: 470-85.

2019b. “Speech and the Rational Soul.” in Aristotle’s Anthropology, eds. Geert Keil & Nora Kreft. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 44-59.

2019. “When Protagoras Made Aristotle His Fitch.” Ancient Philosophy Today: Dialogoi 1: 171-91.

2018. “Affect and Sensation: Plato’s Embodied Cognition.” Phronesis 63: 117-47.

2015. "Protagoras and Plato in Aristotle: Rereading the Measure Doctrine." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 49: 71-129.
2014. "Aristotle’s Cognitive Science: Belief, Affect and Rationality." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89: 394-435.
2013. “Aristotle and the Normativity of Belief.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 44:67-98.