CV Harold Langsam

Professor of Philosophy Corcoran Department of Philosophy 120 Cocke Hall University of Virginia P.O. Box 400780 Charlottesville, VA 22904-4780 (434) 924-6920 (Office) (434) 465-2922 (Home) hll6y@virginia.edu

Employment:

Professor of Philosophy, University of Virginia (2011-) Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Virginia (2001-2011). Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Virginia (1994-2001).

Mellon Postdoctoral Teaching and Research Fellow, Department of Philosophy, Cornell University (1994-95).

Publications:

Book

The Wonder of Consciousness: Understanding the Mind through Philosophical Reflection (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011).

Reviews: Ethics and Medicine, Mind, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Philosophical Quarterly

Articles

"Naïve Realism, Sensory Colors, and the Argument from Phenomenological Constancies," *Philosophical Explorations* (2023) http://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2023.2237976

"Two Kinds of A Priori Justification," *Synthese* 201 (2023) http://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04087-5

"The Will as Joy-Bringer: Nietzsche's Response to Schopenhauer," *Inquiry* (2022) http://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2022.2126392

"Taking Skepticism Seriously," Erkenntnis (2022) http://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00604-z

"McDowell's Infallibilism and the Nature of Knowledge," Synthese 198 (2021): 9787-9801.

"Why Intentionalism Cannot Explain Phenomenal Character," Erkenntnis 85 (2020): 375-389.

"Nietzsche and Value Creation: Subjectivism, Self-Expression, and Strength," *Inquiry* 61 (2018): 100-113.

"The Intuitive Case for Naïve Realism," Philosophical Explorations 20 (2017): 106-122.

"A Defense of McDowell's Response to the Sceptic," Acta Analytica 29 (2014): 43-59.

"A Defense of Restricted Phenomenal Conservatism," Philosophical Papers 42 (2013): 315-340.

"Rationality, Justification, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate," *Erkenntnis* 68 (2008): 79-101.

"Why I Believe in an External World," Metaphilosophy 37 (2006): 652-672.

"Consciousness, Experience, and Justification," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 32 (2002): 1-28.

"Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Inner Observation," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 80 (2002): 42-61.

"Strategy for Dualists," Metaphilosophy 32 (2001): 395-418.

"Pain, Personal Identity, and the Deep Further Fact," Erkenntnis 54 (2001): 247-271.

"Experiences, Thoughts, and Qualia," Philosophical Studies 99 (2000): 269-295.

"Kant's Compatibilism and His Two Conceptions of Truth," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 81 (2000): 164-188.

"Why Colours *Do* Look Like Dispositions," *Philosophical Quarterly* 50 (2000): 68-75, also appears in *Dispositions: 30 Years of Research*, ed. Franz Berto, a special virtual issue of *Philosophical Quarterly*, academic.oup.com/pq/pages/dispositions

"The Theory of Appearing Defended," *Philosophical Studies* 87 (1997): 33-59, reprinted in *Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings*, eds. Alex Byrne and Heather Logue (MIT Press, 2009), pp. 181-205.

"How to Combat Nihilism: Reflections on Nietzsche's Critique of Morality," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 14 (1997): 235-253.

"Why Pains are Mental Objects," Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995): 303-313.

"Kant, Hume, and Our Ordinary Concept of Causation," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54 (1994): 625-647.

Encyclopedia Entry "Theory of Appearing," *Encyclopedia of the Mind*, volume 2, ed. H. Pashler (Sage Publications, 2013), pp. 737-739.

Book Reviews

Book review of John Foster, A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism (Oxford, 2008), in Mind 121 (2012): 812-816.

Book review of Galen Strawson, *Real Materialism and Other Essays* (Oxford, 2008), in *Analysis Reviews* 69 (2009): 779-781.

Book review of Georges Dicker, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge: An Analytical Introduction* (Oxford, 2004), in *Philosophical Books* 47 (2006): 357-359.

Book review of Mark Rowlands, *Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again* (Acumen, 2003), in *Mind* 114 (2005): 193-197.

Book review of Adam Morton, *The Importance of Being Understood: Folk Psychology as Ethics* (Routledge, 2003), in *Philosophical Books* 45 (2004): 63-65.

Book review of E. J. Lowe, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, 2000), in Philosophical Books 42 (2001): 229-231.

Book review of Helen Steward, *The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes and States* (Oxford, 1997) in *Philosophical Books* 40 (1999): 127-129.

Book review of Galen Strawson, *Mental Reality* (MIT, 1994) in *Philosophical Review* 105 (1996): 99-102.

Book review of Jules Coleman, *Risks and Wrongs* (Cambridge, 1992), in *Philosophical Review* 104 (1995): 477-479.

Presented Papers and Lectures:

"Nietzsche and Value Creation," March 2017, Workshop of the International Society for Nietzsche Studies, University of Chicago.

"Internalism and Experiential Justification," September 2015, The Logic and Cognitive Science Initiative Conference on Perception, NC State University; September 2015, University of Virginia. "The Intuitive Case for Naive Realism," January 2013, University of Virginia; April 2013, Virginia Commonwealth University.

"Intentionalism and the Sensory Character of Experience," October 2010, University of Virginia.

Guest Lecture on Human Nature in Political Theory 421: Evolutionary Theory and Human Nature, March 2009, March 2010, University of Virginia.

"Rationality, Justification, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate," February 2003, University of Sheffield; September 2003, Blandy Farm, University of Virginia.

"Why it is Obvious that Pain is Bad and Pleasure is Good (And Why Nothing Else About Value is Obvious)," July 2001, University of Virginia.

"Strategy for Dualists," December 2000, Cognitive Science Workshop, University of Virginia.

Guest lecture on Philosophy of Mind in Psychology 582: Theory of Mind, November 2000, University of Virginia.

"Why I Believe in an External World," October 1999, Blandy Farm, University of Virginia.

"The Phenomenology of Visual Experience: Why Colors *Do* Look Like Dispositions," December 1998, Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Washington, D.C.

"How Experiences Justify Beliefs," November 1998, University of Virginia.

"Kant's Compatibilism and His Two Conceptions of Truth," April 1997, University of Virginia.

"The Deep Further Fact," August 1995, University of Virginia.

"Why Pains are Mental Objects," October 1994, Cornell University.

"The Theory of Appearing Defended," June 1994, University of Virginia.

"Our Knowledge of the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction," January 1994, MIT; February 1994, University of Virginia.

Education:

Princeton University (1979-83), B.A. in Philosophy, 1983. Magna cum laude.

Harvard Law School (1983-86), J.D., 1986. Cum laude.

Princeton University (1989-94), M.A. in Philosophy, 1992; Ph.D. in Philosophy, 1994. Title of

Ph.D. Dissertation: "Towards a Kantian Theory of Intentionality." Dissertation Advisers: Gilbert Harman, Margaret Wilson.

Courses Taught:

Undergraduate: Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, British Empiricism, Nietzsche, Philosophy of Language.

Undergraduate Honors Tutorial: Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind.

Graduate: Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Nietzsche, The Mind-Body Problem, Experience, Perception, Perceptual Knowledge, Color and the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction.

Introductory: Human Nature.

University Service:

Departmental Director of Graduate Studies (1997-2006, 2018-2020, 2022-).

University Summer Grant Committee (2007-2010).

University Committee on Faculty Rules (2011-2017), Committee Chair (2014-2015).

Acting Departmental Director of Undergraduate Programs (2012-2013).

Professional Service:

Journal Referee: Acta Analytica, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, American Philosophical Quarterly, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Dialogue, Ergo, Erkenntnis, Inquiry, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Journal of Philosophy, Metaphilosophy, Mind, Mind and Language, Nous, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophia, Philosophical Explorations, Philosophical Papers, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Synthese, Theoria.

Conference Referee: Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology.

Reviewer for grant proposal: Israel Science Foundation.

Honors and Awards:

Sesquicentennial Associate at the University of Virginia (spring 1999, spring 2005, fall 2010,

spring 2016, fall 2021).

Mellon Postdoctoral Fellowship at Cornell University (1994-95).

Charlotte Elizabeth Proctor Fellowship (Awarded competitively by the Princeton University Faculty to dissertation year students in any department "in recognition of outstanding performance and...promise," 1993).

Phi Beta Kappa membership (awarded 1983).